改變全球貿易秩序！美歐日將聯手圍攻中國| 自由財經
China Is Losing the Trade War With Trump - WSJ
貿易戰重傷！中太陽能產業將損失4.5兆、失業250萬人| 自由財經
這是經濟上的(資源)消耗戰
對比於克勞塞維茲戰爭論中的兩種戰爭勝利法:
消耗戰與殲滅戰WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION
目前屬於消耗戰 中國也擺明不打也不敢直接開戰
美國防部長也明白說中國不求戰爭(可見已正確認識中國意圖不會誤判)
但中國追求以不公平貿易方式掠奪並統治全球
美國必須積極應對這種奇特競爭方式
從中興重創看 中國沒前途
華爾街這篇文章以互相拚酒自殘方式耗下去的競賽
作中美貿易戰的比喻很傳神有趣
也比較美蘇冷戰在雷根總統啟動(欺敵式)星戰計畫軍備競賽
蘇聯最後不堪國力耗損不支倒地
蘇聯東歐集團解體崩潰
美國最後終於贏得冷戰(為何沒提到1980年代美國如何收拾日本的另一場不公平貿易--日本以國內低利率挹注大財團及非關稅障礙消滅國際競爭對手搶奪市占率而崛起)
China Is Losing the Trade War With Trump
It’s like a drinking contest: You harm yourself and hope your opponent isn’t able to withstand as much.
One thing came through loud and clear in President Trump’s press
conference Wednesday with European Commission President
Jean-Claude Juncker.
When they announced an alliance against third parties’ “unfair
trading practices,” they didn’t even have to mention China by name for
listeners to know who their target was. Cooperation between the U.S. and
EU will squeeze China’s protectionist model, and even before this
agreement, there’s been evidence that China is already running up the
white flag.
Yes, China is acting tough in one sense, quickly imposing
tariffs in retaliation for those enacted by the Trump administration.
But while U.S. stocks approach all-time highs and the dollar grows
stronger, Chinese stocks are in a bear market, down 25% since January.
The yuan had its worst single month ever in June, and is well on its way
to a repeat this month. Chinese corporate bonds have defaulted at a
record rate in the past six months, yet this week China unveiled a new
stimulus program designed to encourage even more corporate borrowing.
That’s probably why Yi Gang, a governor of the People’s Bank of China, took the extraordinary step of channeling Herbert Hoover, saying in a statement this month that “the fundamentals of China’s economy are sound.” And it’s why Sun Guofeng, head of the PBOC’s financial research institute, said, China “will not make the yuan’s exchange rate a tool to cope with trade conflicts.”
Weakening one’s currency is a standard weapon in trade wars, and one that China has often been accused of using—including in a tweet by Mr. Trump last week. Devaluation would be even more dangerous in this case because of China’s power to dump the $1.4 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities it holds. But by denying its intention to plunge the yuan, China has disarmed itself voluntarily. This was no act of noble pacifism; it had to be done. Devaluing the currency would risk scaring investors away, an existential threat to an emerging economy. For China, whose state-capitalism model has so far never produced a recession, such capital flight might expose previously hidden economic weaknesses.
These weaknesses accumulate without the market discipline that
occasional recessions impose. The fragility of China’s economy can be
seen in its growth rate, which is slowing despite rising financial
leverage, and in its overinvestment in commodities and real estate. The
escalating trade war with the U.S. could tip China into the unknown
territory of recession—and then capital flight could push it into a
financial crash and depression. That would create mass joblessness in an
economy that has never recorded unemployment higher than 4.3%. With
that scenario in mind, the Chinese government must be wondering whether
it has enough riot police.
The risk of capital flight is real. The last time China let the yuan weaken—a slide that began in early 2014 and was punctuated in mid-2015 by the abandonment of the dollar peg in favor of a basket of currencies—the Chinese ended up losing almost $1 trillion in foreign reserves, which they have yet to recover. Now the sharp weakening of the yuan shows some degree of capital flight again is under way.
No wonder that, despite tough talk from some quarters, the PBOC disarmed itself voluntarily to avoid further capital flight. The bank also is already offering to reimburse local firms for tariffs on imported U.S. goods. What’s more, China has put out a yard sign for international investors by announcing unilateral easing of foreign-ownership restrictions in some industries.
China is beginning to realize that trade war isn’t really war. It’s more like a drinking contest at a fraternity: the game is less inflicting harm on your opponent than inflicting it on yourself, turn by turn. In trade wars, nations impose burdensome import tariffs on themselves in the hope that they’ll be able to stomach the pain longer than their competitor.
Why play such a game? Because a carefully chosen act of self-harm can be an investment toward a worthy goal. For example, President Reagan’s arms race against the Soviet Union in the 1980s was in some sense a costly self-imposed tax. But it turned out the U.S. could bear the burden better than the Soviets could—Uncle Sam eventually out-drank the Russian bear and won the Cold War.
The U.S. will win the trade war with China in the same way. The PBOC’s statements show that the Chinese understand they are too vulnerable to take very many more drinks. The only question is what they will be willing to offer Mr. Trump to get him to take yes for an answer. No wonder Beijing has ordered its state-influenced media to stop demonizing Mr. Trump—officials are desperate to minimize the pain when President Xi Jinping has to cut the inevitable deal.
The drinking-contest metaphor takes us only so far. The wonderful thing about reciprocal trade is that it is a positive-sum game in which all contestants are made better off. If the conflict forces China to accept more foreign investors and goods, comply with World Trade Organization rules, and respect foreign intellectual property, it may feel it has lost but will in fact be better off. With this openness, both economic and political, China could spur a decadeslong second wave of growth that would bring hundreds of millions still living in rural poverty into glittering new cities.
It took Nixon to go to China and show it the way to the 20th century. Now, through the unlikely method of trade war, Donald Trump is ushering China into the 21st century.
Mr. Luskin is chief investment officer at Trend Macrolytics LLC.
That’s probably why Yi Gang, a governor of the People’s Bank of China, took the extraordinary step of channeling Herbert Hoover, saying in a statement this month that “the fundamentals of China’s economy are sound.” And it’s why Sun Guofeng, head of the PBOC’s financial research institute, said, China “will not make the yuan’s exchange rate a tool to cope with trade conflicts.”
Weakening one’s currency is a standard weapon in trade wars, and one that China has often been accused of using—including in a tweet by Mr. Trump last week. Devaluation would be even more dangerous in this case because of China’s power to dump the $1.4 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities it holds. But by denying its intention to plunge the yuan, China has disarmed itself voluntarily. This was no act of noble pacifism; it had to be done. Devaluing the currency would risk scaring investors away, an existential threat to an emerging economy. For China, whose state-capitalism model has so far never produced a recession, such capital flight might expose previously hidden economic weaknesses.
Photo:
iStock/Getty Images
The risk of capital flight is real. The last time China let the yuan weaken—a slide that began in early 2014 and was punctuated in mid-2015 by the abandonment of the dollar peg in favor of a basket of currencies—the Chinese ended up losing almost $1 trillion in foreign reserves, which they have yet to recover. Now the sharp weakening of the yuan shows some degree of capital flight again is under way.
No wonder that, despite tough talk from some quarters, the PBOC disarmed itself voluntarily to avoid further capital flight. The bank also is already offering to reimburse local firms for tariffs on imported U.S. goods. What’s more, China has put out a yard sign for international investors by announcing unilateral easing of foreign-ownership restrictions in some industries.
China is beginning to realize that trade war isn’t really war. It’s more like a drinking contest at a fraternity: the game is less inflicting harm on your opponent than inflicting it on yourself, turn by turn. In trade wars, nations impose burdensome import tariffs on themselves in the hope that they’ll be able to stomach the pain longer than their competitor.
Why play such a game? Because a carefully chosen act of self-harm can be an investment toward a worthy goal. For example, President Reagan’s arms race against the Soviet Union in the 1980s was in some sense a costly self-imposed tax. But it turned out the U.S. could bear the burden better than the Soviets could—Uncle Sam eventually out-drank the Russian bear and won the Cold War.
The U.S. will win the trade war with China in the same way. The PBOC’s statements show that the Chinese understand they are too vulnerable to take very many more drinks. The only question is what they will be willing to offer Mr. Trump to get him to take yes for an answer. No wonder Beijing has ordered its state-influenced media to stop demonizing Mr. Trump—officials are desperate to minimize the pain when President Xi Jinping has to cut the inevitable deal.
The drinking-contest metaphor takes us only so far. The wonderful thing about reciprocal trade is that it is a positive-sum game in which all contestants are made better off. If the conflict forces China to accept more foreign investors and goods, comply with World Trade Organization rules, and respect foreign intellectual property, it may feel it has lost but will in fact be better off. With this openness, both economic and political, China could spur a decadeslong second wave of growth that would bring hundreds of millions still living in rural poverty into glittering new cities.
It took Nixon to go to China and show it the way to the 20th century. Now, through the unlikely method of trade war, Donald Trump is ushering China into the 21st century.
Mr. Luskin is chief investment officer at Trend Macrolytics LLC.
Appeared in the July 28, 2018, print edition.
